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SYMPOSIUM
International Law and Rehnquist-Era Reversals
DIANE MARIE AMANN*

In its waning Terms, the Rehnquist Court held, in Lawrence v. Texas, that due
process bars criminal prosecution of same-sex intimacy and, in Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, that it is cruel and unusual to execute mentally
retarded persons or juveniles.' Each judgment overruled a precedent set earlier
in the tenure of this Court's eponymous member.2 These reversals shared
another trait as well, for in each case Justices consulted international law as an
aid to construing the U.S. Constitution. This Article analyzes that phenomenon.
It first sets forth three Rehnquist-era precedents that granted states leeway to
prosecute in these areas. Then turning to the reversals of those precedents, the
Article traces the role that international law played in Atkins, Lawrence, and
Simmons. It next examines the backlash these consultations spawned-not just
academic criticism, but also congressional calls to impeach judges who look to
international law. Critics tended to pretermit that in looking to external norms
the Court was following a jurisprudential tradition. After marking that tradition,
this Article gives the interpretive practice qualified approval. It is time for
Justices both to articulate when it is appropriate to look to external sources and
to set forth a framework for consultation. At a minimum, foreign jurisprudence
ought to shed the light of experience on issues like those posed in the cases
before the Court; it must arise out of a legal culture that shares with the United
States a commitment to fundamental rights; and the way in which the jurisprudence influenced the Court must be set forth in a reasoned explanation. Whether
a majority of the Court will pursue such a path remains uncertain, however, as
the Rehnquist era ends and that of the new Chief Justice, John G. Roberts, Jr.,
begins.
I.

REHNQUIST-ERA PRECEDENTS

The Rehnquist Court made its debut on the first Monday of October 1986,
days after the swearing-in of William Hubbs Rehnquist as Chief Justice of the
United States and of Antonin Scalia to replace him as an Associate Justice of the

* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law (Martin Luther King, Jr. Hall). ©
2006, Diane Marie Amann. My thanks to The Georgetown Law Journal editor Daniel Staroselsky,
whose keen questions helped to strengthen this Article.
1. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Atkins v.

Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
2. See Simmons, 543 U.S. at 574-75 (overruling the holding in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361
(1989)); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (explicitly overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986));
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319-21 (ruling contrary to the holding in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)).

1319
Originally Published in Georgetown Law Journal
Vol. 94, pp 1319-1346, 2006
HeinOnline -- 94 Geo. L.J. 1319 2005-2006

1320

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 94:1319

U.S. Supreme Court. 3 Rehnquist, who had endured a summer-long campaign
against his elevation, was confirmed despite a record thirty-three Senate "no"
votes. 4 President Ronald Reagan hailed the transition as furthering "'the principle of judicial restraint' and "'government by the people.' 5 Observers across
the political spectrum predicted that Rehnquist would help to move the Court to
the right, toward a position of resistance to pleas either for recognition of
constitutional rights or for expansion of the scope of rights already recognized.
These predictions held in large part true for many of the nineteen Terms that
ensued before Rehnquist succumbed to thyroid cancer on September 3, 2005.6
By 1986 the position of resistance already had won Court favor in the area of
criminal justice; indeed, a bellwether had been sounded three months before
Rehnquist took over as Chief. In Bowers v. Hardwick,7 Justices were asked to
turn back a bid for a declaratory judgment against a Georgia statute that made
the act of sodomy a crime punishable by up to twenty years in prison.8 Five
members, among them then-Associate Justice Rehnquist, acceded, in a judgment that focused on the substantive component of the Due Process Clause. 9
"The issue presented," Justice Byron R. White's opinion for the Court reasoned,
"is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that

3. See Stuart Taylor Jr., Justices to Open 1986 Term Today Facing Key Issues, N.Y TIMEs, Oct. 6,
1986, at Al; Stuart Taylor Jr., Rehnquist and Scalia Take Their Places on Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27,
1986, § 1, at 8 [hereinafter Taylor, Places].
4. Linda Greenhouse, Senate, 65 to 33, Votes to Confirm Rehnquist as 16th ChiefJustice,N.Y. TmiEs,
Sept. 18, 1986, at A1 (writing that "Rehnquist received more negative votes than any other Justice who
has been confirmed to the High Court," while "the debate ... on Judge Scalia consumed barely five
minutes" before his unanimous confirmation). The record was broken five years later, when Senators
confirmed Clarence Thomas by a 52-48 margin. Ross K. Baker, The Sitting Justices: How They Fared
When Facingthe Senate, USA TODAY, Aug. 29, 2005, at 13A.
5. Taylor, Places, supra note 3 (quoting Reagan).
6. For a retrospective highlighting the Court's shift, see David G. Savage, Chief Justice, 80, Led
Court on a Conservative Path, L.A. TIMms, Sept. 4, 2005, at Al. For commentaries that tempered
discussion of this rightward movement by mentioning recent reversals, among them those examined in
this Article, see Cliff Sloan, A Limited Legacy, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2005, at A31, and John Yoo, A
Revolution That Had Run its Course, L.A. TnEs, Sept. 5, 2005, at B15.
7. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
8. Id. at 188 n.1 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984)). As written, the statute pertained even to
heterosexual activity; the majority maintained, however, that only application of the statute to homosexual acts was at issue. Id. at 188 nn.1, 2. But see id. at 200-03 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stressing
dual applicability of the statute); id. at 214-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (analyzing the statute in light of
its prohibition on "all sodomy" and arguing that petitioner's suit ought to have survived a motion to
dismiss).
9. Id. at 187-96 (majority opinion). Bowers involved the application of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which provides that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also U.S.
CONST. amend. V (containing a similar clause limiting actions of the federal government); cf. Bowers,
478 U.S. at 197 (Powell, J., concurring) (indicating that although due process did not protect against
prosecution, had respondent been convicted, "a prison sentence for such conduct--certainly a sentence
of long duration-would create a serious Eighth Amendment issue.").
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still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time."' The
majority answered its question in the negative." A brief concurrence by Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger underscored this conclusion. He found support for the
majority's contention that "proscriptions against sodomy have very 'ancient
roots' in sources other than the domestic laws to which the majority pointed; in
particular, he pointed to "Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards," the
Code of Justinian, and Blackstone's Commentaries.12 The Constitution did not
forbid Georgia to make same-sex intimacy a crime, Burger wrote, for the reason
been
that "[d]ecisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have 13
civilization."
Western
of
history
the
throughout
subject to state intervention
Rehnquist Court rulings respecting criminal justice likewise sustained states'
requests for resistance to claims of rights. Rules designed to exclude tainted
testimonial or physical evidence were relaxed, and proof of deliberate governmental action was entrenched as a prerequisite to constitutional remedy. 14 Of
particular note for present purposes are two decisions issued on the same day in
1989, each of which examined the degree to which the Eighth Amendment's
ban on cruel and unusual punishments' 5 circumscribed governmental authority

10. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. This framing of the question drew considerable criticism from
dissenters in Bowers and thereafter. See id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (asserting that "this case is
about 'the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,' namely, 'the right
to be let alone."') (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (Kennedy, J.) (writing that the articulation of
the issue in Bowers "discloses the Court's own failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake");
Frank N. Coffin, Judicial Balancing: The Protean Scales of Justice, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 16, 29 (1988)
(criticizing Bowers as a "classic example" of "instances where the majority and minority of the Court
see the issue quite differently and, accordingly, march off in opposite directions without acknowledging
the other position"); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Scorn, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1061, 1080-81
(1994) (critiquing the framing of the issue in Bowers); Stephen Reinhardt, The Anatomy of an
Execution: Fairness vs. "Process," 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 313, 341 n.143 (1999) (citing Bowers as
"[a]mong constitutional scholars, the best known example" of the "art" of framing).
It. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193-196.
12. Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting the majority opinion at 192) (spelling as in
original).
13. Id.
14. Many of these opinions were written by Chief Justice Rehnquist. See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette,
519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996) (permitting prosecution based on evidence seized after an officer, during an
objectively justified traffic stop, asked to search a car without mentioning the right not to consent to
search); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 197, 203-04 (1989) (declining to suppress a statement
secured after police advised an interrogee, in deviation from the exact form of the warnings established
by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966), "that a lawyer would be appointed 'if and when you
go to court"'); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165-67 (1986) (establishing coercive police activity
as an essential predicate to judging a confession involuntary); accord DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194-99 & n.5 (1989) (reaffirming that "[t]o make out an Eighth
Amendment claim based on the failure to provide adequate medical care, a prisoner must show that the
state defendants exhibited 'deliberate indifference' to his 'serious' medical needs" and rejecting the
claim that because of "'special relationship"' based on an extension of protective services, the state had
a constitutional duty to protect a child from a beating at the hands of the father) (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976)).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
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to impose the death penalty. One of these, Stanford v. Kentucky,16 concerned the
execution of persons who were sixteen or seventeen years old at the time they
committed murder; the other, Penry v. Lynaugh,"7 concerned the execution of
mentally retarded persons.
The Term before these cases were decided, the Court had held in Thompson v.
Oklahoma1 8 that the Constitution prohibits the execution of fifteen-year-old
murderers. 19 Justice John Paul Stevens's analysis for a plurality began as had
many twentieth-century judgments respecting the clause at issue:
The authors of the Eighth Amendment drafted a categorical prohibition
against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments, but they made no
attempt to define the contours of that category. They delegated that task to
future generations of judges who have been guided by the "evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." In performing that
task the Court has reviewed the work product of state legislatures and
sentencing juries, and has carefully considered the reasons why a civilized
20
society may accept or reject the death penalty in certain types of cases.
The plurality identified a domestic legislative consensus among the states "that
have expressly established a minimum age in their death-penalty statutes"
against executing fifteen year olds, then turned to another source that the Court
previously had deemed relevant; that is, "the views of the international community.",2 1 Citing data in an amicus brief and in a Library of Congress report that
the Court appeared to have commissioned, the plurality demonstrated that the
juvenile death sentence was outlawed in many democracies and in the Soviet
Union.2 2 Moreover, this penalty was prohibited in a number of human rights
treaties that the United States had signed and, in one case, ratified. 23 "The
16. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
17. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
18. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
19. Id. at 838 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 848-59 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Anthony
M. Kennedy, who joined the Court months after oral argument in Thompson, did not participate in the
decision. Id. at 838 (plurality opinion); see also Stuart Taylor Jr., Kennedy Sworn As 104th Justice On
High Court, N.Y. TimEs, Feb. 19, 1988, at A10.
20. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 821-22 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality
opinion)) (footnotes and other citations in quoted text omitted).
21. Id. at 829, 830 n.31 (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 102 & n.35; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
596 n.10 (1977); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796-97 n.22 (1982)).
22. Id. at 830-31 & n.34 (stating that "[a]l information regarding foreign death penalty laws is
drawn from App. to Brief for Amnesty International as Amicus Curiae A-1-A-9, and from Death
Penalty in Various Countries, prepared by members of the staff of the Law Library of the Library of
Congress, January 22, 1988 (available in Clerk of Court's case file)," and specifically citing laws of the
United Kingdom and New Zealand).
23. Id. at 831 n.34 (citing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(5), Dec. 16,
1999, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR], and the Organization of American States, American
Convention on Human Rights art. 4(5), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123
[hereinafter American Convention], both of which the United States had signed but not ratified, and the
Geneva Convention (No. IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 68,
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conclusion that it would offend civilized standards of decency to execute a
person who was less than 16 years old at the time of his or her offense," the
plurality wrote, "is consistent with the views that have been expressed by ...
other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading
members of the Western European community."2 4
Use of foreign and international law to help determine contemporary standards of decency drew immediate rebuke. Such usage "is totally inappropriate
as a means of establishing the fundamental beliefs of this Nation," Scalia
declared in a dissent joined by Rehnquist and White. 25 "The practices of other
nations, particularly other democracies, can be relevant," he conceded, "to
determining whether a practice uniform among our people is not merely a
historical accident, but rather so 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' that
it occupies a place not merely in our mores but, text permitting, in our
Constitution as well.",26 But he argued that converse evidence-evidence of
uniform global opposition-ought not render a U.S. practice unconstitutional.2 7
Evoking a touchstone of judicial review, Scalia wrote, "We must never forget
that it is a Constitution for the United States of America that we are expounding. 19~28
A year later, in Stanford, Scalia prevailed. Joined in full by his erstwhile
fellow dissenters and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, and in part by Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, Scalia wrote that the Constitution permits execution of
offenders as young as sixteen.29 Members of the Court who had composed the
plurality in Thompson restated their view that "the choices of governments
elsewhere in the world also merit our attention as indicators whether a punishment is acceptable in a civilized society," and then cited evidence of widespread
opposition to the juvenile death penalty in "the world community. ' 30 This did
nothing to dissuade the majority. As Scalia put it: "[Ijt is American conceptions

Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention], to which the
United States was already a full state party); cf id. at 851-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (finding in the
U.S. ratification of the Fourth Geneva Convention evidence that Congress did not intend by separate
legislation to authorize a federal death penalty for fifteen year olds).
24. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830.
25. Id. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
26. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
27. Id. ("That 40% of our States do not rule out capital punishment for 15-year-old felons is
determinative of the question before us here, even if that position contradicts the uniform view of the
rest of the world."); see also id. ("But where there is not first a settled consensus among our own
people, the views of other nations, however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be,

cannot be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution.").
28. Id.; cf M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.) (writing that
"we must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding") (emphasis in original).
29. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989); id. at 380-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (joining all of Scalia's opinion save that which maintains the
Court has no duty to apply a proportionality analysis to the sentence imposed).
30. Id. at 384, 390 (Brennan, J., dissenting). These members referred to many countries' abandonment of capital punishment for minors and to the rarity with which such punishment was inflicted even
in countries that had not abolished it formally. See id. at 389-90.
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of decency that are dispositive ... ,,31 Given that the Court in Penry rejected a
challenge to the execution of mentally retarded persons without so much as a
nod at global opinion, this italicized retort in Stanford signaled the Rehnquist
Court's retreat from consultation of international sources.3 2
II. REHNQUIST-ERA REVERSALS

That is where matters stood for thirteen years, until a 2002 challenge to
capital punishment reopened the door to consultation. In contrast with Penry,
the petitioner in Atkins v. Virginia persuaded five Justices that the Eighth
Amendment categorically prohibits execution of mentally retarded offenders.33
Stevens's opinion for the Court focused on domestic indicia of standards of
decency-specifically, on a state legislative trend against the practice,34 on the
paucity of actual executions, and on an "independent" judgment that such
executions do not "measurably advance the deterrent or the retributive purpose
of the death penalty."' 36 After finding a national consensus based on internal
factors, the Court added in a footnote: "Moreover, within the world community,
the imposition of the death penalty for crimes
committed by mentally retarded
37
offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.
Though terse, this observation provoked objections laced with rhetorical
spice. Rehnquist insisted that the decision in Stanford had laid to rest the
practice of consulting other countries' sentencing practices, and rightfully so:
"[I1f it is evidence of a nationalconsensus for which we are looking," he wrote,
"then the viewpoints of other countries simply are not relevant."3 8 In his view,
statutes and jury verdicts "ought to be the sole indicators by which courts
ascertain the contemporary American conceptions of decency for purposes of

31. ld. at 369 n.1 (majority opinion) (emphasis in original).
32. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330-35 (1989) (following analysis of wholly domestic
factors, finding "insufficient evidence of a national consensus against executing mentally retarded
persons"). Even dissenters in Penry steered clear of foreign sources. See id. at 341-49 (Brennan, J.,
joined by Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 349-50 (Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Confirmation of that retreat came in a case unrelated to criminal justice. See
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.ll (1997) (turning aside Justice Breyer's argument in
dissent that experience of federal governments outside the United States might shed light on shared
problems).
33. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-21 (2002) (overruling Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302
(1989)). The Court had agreed to revisit the issue in another case but dismissed the writ of certiorari
after the state enacted a law forbidding execution of mentally retarded persons. McCarver v. North
Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (mem.); see Gina Holland, Court Reviews Executing Mentally IIl, AP
ON NE, Sept. 25, 2001.
34. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-16.
35. Id. at 316.
36. Id. at 322.
37. Id. at 316 n.21 (citing Brief for Amicus Curiae The European Union in Support of the Petitioner
at 4, McCarver v. North Carolina, 532 U.S. 941 (2001) (No. 00-8727)).
38. Id. at 325 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original); accord Antonin Scalia, Commentary, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1119, 1121 (1996) (stating that Stanford "retired" consultation of external
norms).
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the Eighth Amendment. ' 39 Scalia professed to award "the Prize for the Court's
Most Feeble Effort to fabricate 'national consensus' ... to its appeal (deservedly relegated to a footnote) to," among others, "members of the so-called
'world community,' ... whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always
those of our people." 4 °
In spite of this assault, a majority of the Court discussed external sources in
the text of a reversal issued the very next Term. Writing for five members of the
Court in Lawrence v. Texas, Kennedy expressly overruled Bowers to hold that
due process forbids a state from prosecuting criminally the commission of
same-sex sodomy.4" He refuted a key premise in Bowers, that proscriptions
against sodomy enjoyed "ancient roots."4 2 By the time Bowers was decided,
Britain already had repealed criminal statutes respecting homosexual conduct,
and the European Court of Human Rights already had held that such statutes
violated the region's human rights convention; an accurate assessment of the
foreign legal landscape thus would have precluded the apprehension of "Western civilization" that underlay the result in Bowers.4 3 Scalia, joined once again
by Rehnquist and also by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented. "The Bowers
majority opinion never relied on values we share with a wider civilization," he
maintained, "but rather rejected the claimed right to sodomy on the ground that
such a right was not deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."" 4 He
dubbed the Court's discussion of external sources as dictum that was "meaningjudicial imposition of
less" yet "[d]angerous," on the ground that it invited
45
"'foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.'
The Court in Atkins had taken pains to note that after Stanford, in contrast
with the post-Penry trend respecting mentally retarded offenders, very few
states raised the minimum age for capital punishment. 46 Nonetheless, just three
years after deciding Atkins, a five-member majority departed from Stanford and

39. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). O'Connor agreed with the result but based her
reasoning on equal protection principles. See id. at 579-86 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 567-73 (criticizing reference to such roots in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192
(1986)) (internal quotations omitted).
43. Compare id. at 572-73 (discussing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 149
& para. 52 (1981); Sexual Offences Act, 1967, c. 60, § 1(1) (Eng. & Wales)), with Bowers, 478 U.S. at
196 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-77 (noting that in intervening years
the European human rights court has adhered to its decision in Dudgeon and that "[o]ther nations, too,
have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage
in intimate, consensual conduct") (citing Brief Amici Curiae of Mary Robinson et al. in Support of
Petitioners at 11-12, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102)).
44. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J.,dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted) (emphases in original).
45. Id. (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of

certiorari)).
46. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 n.18 (2002) ("Although we decided Stanford on the same
day as Penry, apparently only two state legislatures have raised the threshold age for imposition of the
death penalty.").
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held in Roper v. Simmons that the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of
persons who were under eighteen at the time of their offense. 47 Again, "objective indicia" of "national consensus" and the Court's "independent judgment on
the proportionality of the death penalty" took center stage. 48 Again, too, the
majority looked beyond U.S. borders for support; indeed, it detailed a long
tradition of "referr[ing] to the laws of other countries and to international
authorities as instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition of 'cruel and unusual punishments."' 4 9 Kennedy's opinion for the
Court discussed external sources-including human rights instruments such as
the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, as well as British law-that forbid execution of
minors. 50 "Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the
United States is the only country in the world that continues to give official
sanction to the juvenile death penalty," Kennedy wrote, and added, "This reality
does not become controlling,1 for the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment
5
remains our responsibility.,
Attributing the result in Simmons to "the subjective views of five Members of
this Court and like-minded foreigners," Scalia dissented in an opinion joined by
Rehnquist and Thomas.52 Scalia asserted once again that the Court ought not to
have taken anything other than legislative enactments and jury verdicts into
account: "In other words, all the Court has done today, to borrow from another
context, is to look over the heads of the crowd and pick out its friends. 5 3 In the
dissenters' view, the role that external sources played in Simmons was not

47. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574, 578 (2005).
48. See id. at 564-74.
49. Id. at 574-75 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958); citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at
317 n.21; Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 & n.31 (1988); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 796-97 n.22 (1982); and Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977)). Phrasing in the text
echoes the title of one Justice's defense of the consultation of foreign law. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in ConstitutionalAdjudication,
22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 329 (2004) (hereinafter Ginsburg, Borders].
50. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 576-78 (citing U.N. Convention the Rights of the Child art. 37, Nov. 20,
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Children's Convention]; ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 6(5); American
Convention, supra note 23, art. 4(5); African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child art. 5(3),
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990); Criminal Justice Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 58 (U.K.); and
practices in other countries).
51. Id. at 575. Kennedy repeated this position at the end of his opinion in Simmons:
The opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide
respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions....
It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowledge
that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples simply
underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of freedom.
Id. at 578.
52. Id. at 608 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
53. Id. at 617 (citing Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (observing in a critique of the majority's method of interpreting the statute at issue that
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"confirmatory," as O'Connor had put it, 54 but rather, to coin an antonym,
"conformatory": Scalia contended that "the basic premise of the Court's argument" is "that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the
world," and he urged that this "be rejected out of hand. 5 5 He further cautioned
that serious consideration of external sources would call into question a host of
U.S. practices, some widely held to be more protective of individual rights than
their counterparts abroad.5 6 Yet he hastened to argue that the Court's use of such
sources was not, in fact, serious. "What these foreign sources 'affirm,"' Scalia
wrote, "is the Justices' own notion of how57the world ought to be, and their diktat
that it shall be so henceforth in America.
III.

BACKLASH

Scalia's complaints pointed to a broader uneasiness respecting the Court's
increased willingness to consult international norms and foreign jurisprudence.
On his reelection campaign trail, President George W. Bush had said he was
"deeply concerned" that matters like gay rights were being decided by judges
"and not the citizenry of the United States."5 8 He endorsed a controversial
statute that withdraws from judges the power to interpret the word "marriage,"
and pledged that his judicial appointees would be "strict constructionists. ' '59 The
latter term often is used to refer to those who profess to interpret the Constitution by looking at little more than what words meant at the time they were
adopted-and surely not those who look to contemporary external norms as an
interpretive source. As Bush spoke, pending in Congress was a resolution that
would proclaim "the sense of the House of Representatives that judicial determinations regarding the meaning of the laws of the United States should not be
based in whole or in part on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign
institutions unless" the latter "are incorporated into the legislative history of
laws passed by the elected legislative branches of the United States or otherwise
inform an understanding of the original meaning of the laws of the United

"Judge Harold Leventhal used to describe the use of legislative history as the equivalent of entering a
crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one's friends")).
54. See id. at 604-05 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that external sources may play a "confirmatory role," but only after establishment of a "genuine national consensus," and, in her view, the latter
did not exist with respect to the juvenile death penalty) (emphases in original).
55. Id. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 623-627 (referring specifically to the exclusionary rule, separation of church and state,
abortion jurisprudence, double jeopardy, and the right to trial by jury).
57. Id. at 628.
58. Transcript of Debate Between Bush and Kerry, With Domestic Policy the Topic, N.Y. TtMES, Oct.
14, 2004, at A22.
59. Id. (voicing support for Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 § 3(a), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000) (defining
"marriage" to mean "only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife," and
"spouse" to mean "a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or wife"); see also The Presidential
Debate; Excerpts from Debate; Bush, Kerry Meet in Town Hall, L.A. TiMEs, Oct. 9, 2004, at A21
(calling for judges who "interpret" rather than "make" law).
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States."' 60 The preamble to this proposal, like versions that preceded and
succeeded it, made clear that the Court's references to foreign and international
norms in Atkins and Lawrence had spurred these members to act.6' Cosponsors
said that consultation posed a threat to U.S. sovereignty; 62 one went so far as to
suggest that if such a resolution were to pass, judicial disregard of its admonition would invite impeachment.6 3
Justices pushed back. In what would prove to be his last annual report,
Rehnquist, whom Reagan had elevated in pursuit of "judicial restraint,"''6
expressed dismay at "the recently mounting criticism of judges for engaging in
what is often referred to as 'judicial activism.' 65 Interbranch criticism generally is "healthy in maintaining a balance of power in our government," Rehnquist allowed.66 But he warned that "Congress's authority to impeach and
remove judges should not extend to decisions from the bench" lest the independence that the Constitution guarantees federal judges be unduly threatened.67
Stevens, meanwhile, told a gathering of judges and lawyers that he had "received a copy of a mass mailing suggesting that I should be impeached for
joining Justice Kennedy's opinion" in Simmons. 68 After detailing how the letter
"seriously distorts" that decision, Stevens said:

60. H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004).
61. Id. (citing Lawrence); see also H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005) (allowing for use of foreign law
if consistent with the "original meaning of the Constitution of the United States," and mentioning
Lawrence as catalyst for the proposal); H.R. Res. 446, 108th Cong. (2003) (after citing both Atkins and
Lawrence, omitting an originalist exception in resolving that "the Supreme Court should base its
decisions on the Constitution and the Laws of the United States, and not on the law of any foreign
country or any international law or agreement not made under the authority of the United States"); cf
Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy's Passion for Foreign Law Could Change the
Supreme Court,NEw YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42 (reporting that one congressional critic conducted an
investigation of Justices' overseas travel in the five years before Lawrence was decided).
62. Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (R-WI), Zale Lecture in Public Policy, Stanford University 6
(May 9, 2005), http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/stanfordjudgesspeechpressversion505.pdf (declaring that the bill "safeguards the sovereignty for which America's Founding generation and those who
have followed have fought and died" and promising that "Congress will continue to monitor judicial
operations just as the Judiciary will continue to evaluate our legislative work").
63. See Tom Curry, A Flap Over Foreign Matter at the Supreme Court, MSNBC, Mar. 11, 2004,
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4506232 (quoting Rep. Tom Feeney (R-FL) as stating that judges who
deliberately ignored Congress deserved the "ultimate remedy, which would be impeachment"); cf
Transcript: Day Three of the Roberts Confirmation Hearings(Morning Session: Sens. Brownback and
Coburn), WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Sept. 14, 2005, availableat 2005 WLNR 14639466 (remarks of Sen.
Tom Coburn (R-OK)) [hereinafter Roberts-Coburn Transcript] (indicating his own position, in confirmation hearings for Rehnquist's successor, that consulting foreign sources was not "good behavior" within
the meaning of Article M, thereby implicitly characterizing consultation as an impeachable offense).
64. See supra text accompanying note 5.
65. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 2004 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1 (2005), http://
www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2004year-endreport.pdf.
66. Id. at 4.
67. Id. at 5; see Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Resumes His Call for Judicial Independence, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 1, 2005, at A10.
68. John Paul Stevens, "Justice Stevens' Remarks," Seventh Circuit Judicial Conference Dinner, at 2
(May 23, 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter Stevens Remarks].
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It does seem to me, however, that there is a vast difference between, on the
one hand, considering the thoughtful views of other scholars and judges whether they be Americans or foreigners and whether they be state judges,
federal judges or judges sitting in other countries - before making up our own
minds, and, on the other hand, treating international opinion as controlling our
interpretation of our own law.
We should not be impeached for the former; we
69
are not guilty of the latter.

Like Stevens, many of the Justices who looked to external norms in Atkins or
the other two Rehnquist-era reversals under review have since made public
comments in defense of this interpretive practice.7 °
Revived use of external norms also sparked debate in academic journals.
Commentators tended to agree on the need for theory and methodology for
consultation regardless of their opinion about the propriety of consultation.71
On that antecedent question, some favored the Court's show of interest in global
matters, especially in times of rapid globalization. 72 "Justices who declare the

69. Id. at 3, 8. See generally Diane Marie Amann, John Paul Stevens, Human Rights Judge, 74
FoRDHIAM L. REv. 1569 (2006) (detailing Stevens's role in the reversals discussed in this Article and
positing reasons for Stevens's selective receptivity to foreign context).
70. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 AM. Soc'Y Nr'L L. PRoc. 265, 265 (2003);
Ginsburg, Borders, supra note 49; An Open Discussion with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36 CoN. L.
REv. 1033, 1040-42 (2004); The Relevance of ForeignLegal Materials in U.S. ConstitutionalCases:A
Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 519,
522-24 (2005) [hereinafter Scalia-Breyer Conversation]; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, "A Decent Respect to
the Opinions of [Human]kind:" The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication
(Apr. 1, 2005), http://www.asil.org/events/AM05/ginsburgO5O40l.html; Sandra Day O'Connor, Remarks to Southern Center for International Studies 2 (Oct. 28, 2003), http://www.southerncenter.org/
OConnor.transcript.pdf; see also Toobin, supra note 61 (reporting Justice Kennedy's defense of
consultation).
71. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box: TransnationalLaw and
the U.S. Constitution, 82 Thx. L. Rev. 1989, 2004-10 (2004) (positing an American popular sovereignty
account that eases legitimacy objections to the use of external norms); Roger P. Alford, In Search of a
Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 639, 703-12 (2005) (having shown the
unsuitability of theories such as originalism, offering his own theory for consultation); Michael D.
Ramsey, InternationalMaterialsand Domestic Rights: Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J.
Irr'L L. 69, 72-82 (2004) (setting forth guidelines for a "rigorous project" of consultation); Patricia M.
Wald, The Use of InternationalLaw in the American Adjudicative Process, 27 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
431, 439-40 (2004) [hereinafter Wald, Use] (finding, in a presentation by a former federal appellate
judge, "some truth" in the concern of a onetime colleague that consultation may not always take into
adequate account the differences in legal systems and cultures) (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING
VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 137 (2003)); Mary Ann Glendon, Judicial Tourism, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 16, 2005, at A14 ("The problem is not reference to foreign law: It is how foreign law is used by
judges who usurp powers reserved under the Constitution to the people and their elected representatives, and whose desire to 'learn' is limited to finding arguments in support of conclusions that have
little constitutional warrant.").
72. E.g., Daniel Bodansky, The Use of International Sources in Constitutional Opinion, 32 GA.
J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 421, 421 (2004) (stressing "the myriad ways" the United States is "connected to
other countries" in the course of approving consultation practice); Harold Hongju Koh, International
Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 56 (2004) (finding in "transnationalist jurisprudence" a
suggestion that "the United States expresses its national sovereignty not by blocking out all foreign
influence but by vigorous 'participation in the various regimes that regulate and order the international
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world irrelevant to our Constitution make our Constitution appear irrelevant to
the world," Professor Gerald L. Neuman wrote.7 3 "Such isolation," he added,
"would impair the promotion of U.S. constitutional values for U.S. citizens. 74
But others worried that consultation of foreign norms strayed from American
constitutional tradition, or warned that consultation could undermine the legitimacy and accountability of the Court.75 Quoting Professor Charles Fried,
Professor Roger P. Alford posited that the "'canon of authoritative materials
from which constitutional common law reasoning might go forward"' is composed of "text, structure, history, and national experience," and then argued that
the addition of international sources to this canon76"fundamentally destabilizes
the equilibrium of constitutional decisionmaking.,
IV.

BACKSTORY

But international sources long have belonged to the interpretive canon.
Professor Steven G. Calabresi and Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, among others,
have written that "those ... who say that the Court has never before cited or
relied upon foreign law are clearly and demonstrably wrong. '77 As early as

1804, Chief Justice John Marshall established the Charming Betsy principle,
which counsels courts not to adopt a construction that would violate international law unless there is no alternative construction. 7 8 Early citations to the
"law of nations"-the "decisions of the Courts of every country, so far as they
are founded upon a law common to every country"-often occurred in cases

system"' (quoting AiaRAm CHAYEs & ANTotA HANDLER CuAYvs, THE NEw SoVEREIGNTY: CoMPLIANCE
wrrH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 27 (1995)); Peter E. Quint, InternationalHuman Rights:
The Convergence of Comparativeand InternationalLaw, 36 TEx. INT'L L.J. 605, 610 (2001) (hoping to
"welcome" the "impact of comparative and international law on our human rights jurisprudence");
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARv. INT'L L.J. 191, 219 (2003) (seeing
cross-border dialogue among judges as a key component "to build a world under law").
73. Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of InternationalLaw in ConstitutionalInterpretation,98 AM. J.
INT'L L. 82, 87 (2004).
74. Id.
75. E.g., Eugene Kontorovich, Disrespectingthe "Opinions of Mankind," 8 GREEN BAG 2D 261, 265
(2005) (criticizing "internationalists"' frequent quotation of the Declaration of Independence, arguing
that "the Declaration was written to shape the opinions of mankind; it did not contemplate being
influenced by them"); Harvie Wilkinson 1I, The Use of InternationalLaw in Judicial Decisions, 27
H~Av. J.L. & Pua. POL'Y 423, 429 (2004) (stating, as a federal appellate judge, that "use of international
law to resolve social issues of domestic import runs counter to the democratic accountability and
federal structure envisioned by our Constitution").
76. Roger P. Alford, Misusing InternationalSources to Interpret the Constitution,98 AM. J. INT'L L.
57, 57-58 (2004) (quoting Charles Fried, Scholars and Judges, Reason and Power, 23 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 807, 819 (2000)).
77. Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of
Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 743, 755 (2005); see also Diane Marie Amann, "Raise the Flag and Let It Talk": On the Use of
External Norms in ConstitutionalDecision Making, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 597, 601-02 (2004) [hereinafter Amann, Norms] (citing instances of consultation).
78. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
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that raised no constitutional issue. 79 But there were exceptions; in an 1832
judgment, Marshall discussed what today would be called international law in
the course of situating Native American tribes within the constitutional structure. 80

In such instances, the Court embraced an understanding of the United States
as a member of a larger community, one from which it had drawn many of its
citizens and many of its values. It was a "national character" in keeping with the
one advanced scant years before in FederalistNo. 63, written to justify establishment of a Senate as an august institution whose members would be chosen in
state legislatures rather than in direct elections and who would be older and hold
office longer than others in Congress. 8 ' This body's remove from frequent
elections, it was argued, would help the new country to win "respect and
confidence" in the world.82 The essay argued that "attention to the judgment of
other nations is important to every government," both to demonstrate the
wisdom of American decisions and to aid decision in close matters: "[I]n
doubtful cases, particularly where the national councils may be warped by some
strong passion or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the
impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed., 83 The Court's
references to the law of nations in early decisions may be seen as efforts by
another governmental body, even more removed from the political fray, to
enhance the fledgling nation's status in the global arena. The references suggest
that there may be an originalist justification for some consultation-a justification that no doubt would come as a surprise to those members of Congress who
oppose consultation but would allow it when consistent with the Constitution's
"original meaning." 84
Although the Court made fewer overt references to external sources as its
own corpus of jurisprudence grew, it never ceased entirely to look abroad in the
course of construing the U.S. Constitution. Awareness of connections to a larger
world was evident, for example, during the half-century long, piecemeal process
known as "selective incorporation," by which the Court determined that nearly
all the guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights are so fundamental that they
79. Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815) (controversy arising
out of a wartime capture of a vessel).
80. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 560-61 (1832); see also Rex D. Glensy, Which Countries
Count?: Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection of Foreign Persuasive Authority, 45 VA. J. lNr'L L. 357,
364-66 (2005) (providing an extended account of early uses of international law); Wald, Use, supra
note 71, at 441 (noting the frequency with which Marshall looked to foreign sources).
81. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 407-08 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (1 st Modern Library
ed., 1941).
82. Id. at 407.
83. Id. at 407-08; see also Wald, Use, supra note 71, at 441 (quoting a passage in THE FEDERAISr
No. 63, supra note 81, at 408, that "asked of the embryonic United States, 'how many errors and follies
would she not have avoided, if the justice and propriety of her measures had, in every instance, been
previously tried by the light in which they would probably appear to the unbiased part of mankind?"').
84. See H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005), quoted supra note 61; H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004),
quoted supra text accompanying note 60.
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apply not only to the federal government, but also, by dint of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to the governments of the Union's sundry
states. 85 The Court articulated various tests for whether a guarantee thus implicated "fundamental fairness. ' 86 A few expressly called for examination of
non-U.S. sources: Justices asked in some instances if the guarantee was "enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional documents of Englishspeaking peoples, 87 and in others if it was "part of the Anglo-American legal
heritage.", 88 Furthermore, judgments setting forth tests that seemed domestic in
dimension nevertheless discussed foreign practice in determining whether the
test had been satisfied. In one case the Court drew negative lessons from the old
English Star Chamber and its corollaries in Spain and France as it decided that a
state's criminal procedure denied rights "basic in our system of jurisprudence" ;89 concurring, Justice Wiley Rutledge likened the state's process to
fascist regimes in mid-century Europe. 90 And Justice Benjamin Cardozo gave
effect to what has become a leading formula for incorporation-whether a
guarantee is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"-by looking not only to
U.S. sources but also to a treatise by British scholar Jeremy Bentham and to
studies of Roman and French law that illuminated "the established procedure in
the law of Continental Europe." 9 ' It is on account of this tradition that even the
Rehnquist Court's most mordant critic of consultation conceded that examination of foreign practice bears relevance to fundamental fairness inquiries.92
Consultation also has been a component of evaluation of whether a governmental practice violated an enumerated right. Interpretation of the Fourth Amend-

85. See, e.g., Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation:Revisited, 71 GEo. L.J. 253 (1982) (offering a
detailed survey and retrospective critique of process); see also Diane Marie Amann, Harmonic
Convergence? Constitutional CriminalProcedure in an InternationalContext, 75 IND. L.J. 809, 812-14
(2000) [hereinafter Amann, Convergence?] (describing process and citing principal precedents).
86. For examples of the many uses of this term, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-50
(1968) and Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 148 (1954).
87. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 n.42 (1977) (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,
27-28 (1949)) (internal quotations omitted).
88. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(internal quotations omitted).
89. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 269-71,273 (1948).
90. Id. at 281 (Rutledge, J., concurring); see Diane Marie Amann, Guantdnamo, 42 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 263, 345-47 (2004) [hereinafter Amann, Guantdnamo] (discussing Rutledge's concurrence); see also Amann, Norms, supra note 77, at 601 & nn.20-21 (citing other opinions demonstrating
the influence of an "abhorrence of ancient inquisitional abuse and contemporary totalitarian repression"
on the determination of which rights are fundamental in the United States).
91. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 & n.3 (1937) (holding after review of such sources that
the incorporation test had not been satisfied in a challenge to the state's appeal of petitioner's criminal
trial).
92. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The account of
Scalia's position advanced in reply to this Article suffers for failure even to mention Scalia's own
concession that in the context of the Eighth Amendment and other fundamental fairness doctrines,
consultation is relevant to determine not only original meaning, but also evolving standards. See
Kenneth Starr, Pragmatism Rules: A Response to Professors Chemerinsky and Amann, 94 GEo. L.J.
1565, 1583-85 (2006) (treating Scalia's position as limited to original meaning).
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ment guarantee that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, ' 93 has prompted judicial consideration of external laws or
practices. 94 The same has been true with regard to the Eighth Amendment's
95
requirement that "cruel and unusual punishments" shall not be "inflicted.
Frequently cited as the basis for consultation in such cases is Trop v. Dulles,96 a
1958 case involving a native-born American stripped of his nationality after he
was convicted of deserting the Army during World War 11. 9 7 Endeavoring to
ascribe meaning to "cruel and unusual punishments," Chief Justice Earl Warren
traced the clause to the Magna Carta of 1215.98 "The basic concept," he
continued, "is nothing less than the dignity of man," such that the state must
exercise its "power to punish ... within the limits of civilized standards." 99
Asserting that the terms "are not precise, and that their scope is not static," he
wrote that the clause "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. '' l °° That "[t]he civilized
nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be
imposed as punishment for crime" contributed to the conclusion that denationalization of petitioner violated the Constitution.'0 1 Though the opinion failed to
persuade a majority in Trop, consultation of external norms consequently won
acceptance as a part of Justices' evolving standards inquiry.'° 2
The attack on consultation launched in Thompson and secured in Stanford
93. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
94. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948) (Jackson, J.) (writing, in a decision
issued not long after Jackson's service as Chief U.S. Prosecutor at the Nuremberg trial of Nazi war
criminals, that to allow the state to enter a home without justification "would obliterate one of the most
fundamental distinctions between our form of government, where officers are under the law, and the
police-state where they are the law"); see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-29 (1886) (giving
broad protection in part on account of a determination that the Framers drafted the Fourth Amendment
as a safeguard against general warrants like those used by England's Star Chamber); United States v.
Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 490 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating, in an opinion by then-Judge Kennedy, that foreign
law may be relevant to determine whether to suppress evidence obtained in the course of a warrantless
search abroad).
95. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII, quoted in fuU supra note 15.
96. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
97. Id. at 87-88.
98. Id. at 100 (plurality opinion).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 100-01.
101. Id. at 102-03 (citing study by United Nations on the issue). Justice William J. Brennan
concurred on different grounds. See id. at 105-14.
102. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982) (noting the status of the felony
murder doctrine in India, England, Canada, and continental Europe); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
596 n. 10 (1977) (plurality opinion) (deeming it "not irrelevant" to a determination of the constitutionality of capital punishment for rape "that out of 60 major nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3
retained the death penalty for rape where death did not ensue") (citing U.N. DEP'T OF EcON. & Soc.
AFF., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 40, 86 (1968)). But see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 325 (2002)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (writing that "the Trop plurality-representing the view of only a minority
of the Court-offered no explanation for its own citation, and there is no reason to resurrect this view
given our sound rejection of the argument in Stanford").
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appears in this light an aberration. Atkins, Lawrence, and Simmons, though they
reversed results in early Rehnquist-era cases, are revealed as renewals of a
tradition of looking at foreign and international law as aids to constitutional
interpretation. It is a tradition that found in foreign sources evidence that
confirmed the Court's understanding of contemporary American standards, and
not, contrary to Scalia's allegation, a command to conform to an external
norm. 10 3 It is a tradition in which all who sat on the High Court at the time of
Rehnquist's death had, at times, taken part. Breyer and Ginsburg showed
especial interest in consultation.' O'Connor did too, though her deployment of
foreign law often was measured.1 °5 Stevens and Kennedy were the authors of
the judgments under review; Justice Souter cast tacit votes in favor. 10 6 The
ardor with which Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas inveighed against consultation
obscured the fact that they too had cited foreign practice, when sources consulted opposed a claim of constitutional right.10 7 Notwithstanding those methodological lapses, for more than a dozen years the critique forged by these three
Justices staved off consultation and garnered significant political support. For
the first time in memory, judicial use of external norms is a chronic source of
controversy. 0 8 Something else is at play.

103. See supra text accompanying note 55. Dissenters proffered no evidence of any conformatory
imperative. A case unrelated to these reversals presented the possibility of a requirement to conform, for
petitioner contended that because the United States had submitted to the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice with respect to a consular relations treaty, the U.S. Supreme Court was
bound to enforce the World Court's order for review of death sentences imposed against defendants
whose rights under that treaty police had violated. Brief for Petitioner at 19, Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S.
Ct. 2088 (2005) (No. 04-5928). Justices declined to reach the merits, thus leaving the question of
obligation to enforce undecided. See Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2092.
104. See Amann, Norms, supra note 77, at 602 & n.28 (describing these Justices' approach toward
international developments).
105. See id. at 602-03 & nn.25-27 & 29 (discussing O'Connor's approach toward international
developments).
106. Id. at 602-03 & n.28 (outlining views of these Justices).
107. See id. at 603-04 (noting references to foreign developments in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 718 n.16 (1997) (discussing laws in Australia, Britain, Canada, Colombia, and New Zealand
in holding that there is no U.S. constitutional right to assisted suicide), and Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 945 n.l (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (mentioning rulings in Canada and Germany and arguing that
the U.S. Constitution allows some limits on abortion)). It is to be noted that these three dissented from
reversals under review in part by reference to other countries' norms or practices. See Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624-27 (2005) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (detailing differences between U.S. and foreign rights jurisprudence); Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting) (faulting the
Court for "ignoring, of course, the many countries that have retained criminal prohibitions on
sodomy").
108. See Bodansky, supra note 72, at 426 ("In contrast to today, I am not aware that when the Court,
in these earlier cases, paid a decent respect to the opinions of mankind, this was criticized as
illegitimate or otherwise un-American.").
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V. AcTIvisM AND INTERACTION

Debate respecting consultation of foreign and international practice entangles
two separate yet not unrelated questions: first, whether it is appropriate for
judges to ascertain the meaning of constitutional provisions by reference to
sources other than plain text and framers' intent; and second, whether and to
what extent the U.S. justice system should become a site for negotiation of
transnational tensions. The former question-that of activism-embodies the
enduring dispute respecting the proper role of unelected judges in a democracy.
The latter question-that of interaction--captures concerns respecting the place
of the United States in the global arena. Both questions have a long provenance,
yet both seemed especially pressing in the Rehnquist era.
As each reversal brought with it added complaints, it appeared ever clearer
that use of foreign law was not all that bothered critics. The crux of the problem
was the persistence of living-Constitution doctrines. One such doctrine finds in
the Due Process Clause substantive as well as procedural protection. Another
finds in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause a duty to adapt to "evolving
standards of decency," phrasing that was first articulated in 1958 yet derives
from a Court judgment issued nearly a half-century before that date. In Trop,
Chief Justice Earl Warren made express reference to Weems v. United States.10 9
There, a court in the Philippines, a U.S. territory, had applied old Spanish law to
sentence a U.S. civil servant convicted of falsifying an official document to a
minimum of "confinement in a penal institution for twelve years and one day, a
chain at the ankle and wrist of the offender, hard and painful labor, no assistance
from friend or relative, no marital authority or parental rights or rights of
property, no participation even in the family council," after which he would
have to endure "a perpetual limitation of his liberty" by means of surveillance
and civil disqualifications." 0 The Court first deemed the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause that the United States had imposed on the Philippines
identical in meaning to that in the U.S. Constitution."' Its consequent prescription for interpreting the clause amounted to a paean to the living Constitution:
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an
experience of evils but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had therefore taken. Time works changes,
brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Theretofore a principle, to
be vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it
birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the words of

109. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion) (discussing Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)).
110. Weems, 217 U.S. at 366.
111. Id. at 367-68.
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Chief Justice Marshall, "designed
to approach immortality as nearly as human
2
institutions can approach it.""
Out of this precedent emerged Warren's statement that the Eighth Amendment
"must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
11 3
progress of a maturing society."
Living-Constitution doctrines require the Court to render a decision faithful
both to constitutional history and to contemporary circumstance. Seldom will
the words of a provision-particularly of an open-textured term like "due
process," "cruel and unusual," or, for that matter, "unreasonable"' 4-prove the
final authority. The doctrines thus invite judges to consult additional sources.
Some of those sources would not be admitted into the Fried-Alford "'canon of
authoritative materials,"' for one expects that Fried and Alford would ascribe to
"national experience" a narrow meaning.' 15 So too the opponents to consultation on the Court: Rehnquist, joined by Scalia and Thomas, defined "national
consensus" regarding the death penalty as nothing more than "the work product
of state legislatures and sentencing jury determinations."'1 16 Other sources are to
be held inappropriate whether they are domestic or foreign. Accordingly, criticism of citations to foreign law has stood not alone, but rather alongside
criticism of briefs by domestic groups, among them American psychologists and
117
American Catholic bishops.
The clich6 critique of dynamic-construction doctrines is that they upset the
balance of power embedded in the Constitution-that they transform an unelected judiciary into a legislature whose so-called "activist" decisions may
subvert majority will and thus undercut popular sovereignty. 118 But that critique
ignores another bedrock principle of the United States's constitutional compact.
No less officers of the national government than are legislators or the President,
federal judges have the duty, as James Madison put it, to "consider themselves
in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights" in the Constitution and "an
112. Id. at 373 (quoting, without citation, Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 387 (1821)).
113. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (plurality opinion); accord Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,
821 n.4 (1988) (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J.) (tracing the evolutive approach forwarded in Trop to
Weems).
114. See Amann, Guantdnamo, supra note 90, at 301 & n.165 (discussing the particular usefulness
of consultation of external sources in construing the Constitution's open-textured clauses).
115. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
116. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 324 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), discussed supra
text accompanying note 39.
117. E.g., id. at 347 & n.6 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (deeming irrelevant not only world opinion, but
also "the views of professional and religious organizations," including the U.S. Catholic Conference
and the American Psychological Association).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 56-62 (quoting examples of this critique); see also Relating
to the Use of Foreign Materials in Interpreting U.S. Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 106 n.27 (2004) (statement of Michael D.
Ramsey, Professor of Law, University of San Diego Law School), availableat http://judiciary.house.gov
media/pdfs/ramsey032504.pdf; cf.Starr, supra note 92, at 1580 (placing controversy respecting use of
foreign law materials "[alt the center of the 'who decides' debate").
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impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the Legislative or
Executive ....",9 To promote this function, the Constitution safeguards judges'
independence," 0 and the Court has developed doctrines of construction that
make it possible for a judge to refuse to sustain a state practice that, though an
expression of the will of the majority, trounces the rights of disfavored individuals.
Each of the judgments under review provoked dissenters' dismay not just
because it cited foreign law, but also, crucially, because it reinforced a doctrine
of dynamic interpretation. Stevens recognized as much when he wrote in
Simmons, "Perhaps even more important than our specific holding today is our
reaffirmation of the basic principle that informs the Court's interpretation
of the
21
doctrine.1
standards"
"evolving
the
of
is,
that
Amendment";
Eighth
That said, consultation of external norms is a particularly prickly aspect of
the "activism" critique. Stated fears of interference, erosion of a domestic legal
culture considered exceptional, and encroachments on sovereignty are hallmarks of some Americans' mistrust of influence from abroad. They are manifest
in the U.S. government's ambivalent behavior toward international agreements
and its active opposition to the International Criminal Court. 122 With respect to
judicial interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, these concerns are embodied in
the seemingly self-evident propositions that foreign sources are aliens and that
sovereignty yields when those sources control. In fact, however, neither proposition obtains.
In none of the judgments under review did the Court seek in external norms
the rule that would govern its decision. Rather, norms were consulted as
persuasive authority-as sources that might enrich understanding of contemporary values or provide lessons learned from others' experiences with similar
problems. The Court thus explained in Atkins that although factors such as
world opinion "are by no means dispositive," the fact of "their consistency with
the legislative evidence lends further support to our conclusion that there is a
119. 1 ANNALS OF

CONG.

439 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).

120. See id. (describing guardians of rights as "independent tribunals of justice"); THE FEDERALIST
No. 78, at 508 (Alexander Hamilton) (1st Modem Library ed., 1941) (calling the independent federal
judiciary "the bulwark[] of a limited Constitution"). Dean Kenneth Starr has characterized the concern
for vulnerable persons animating decision in Atkins and Simmons as little more than a byproduct of
judicial pragmatism. See Starr, supra note 92, at 1566-68. One expects he would say much the same
about the concern for vulnerable persons in Lawrence. The perspective profoundly discounts the
judge's duty to guard the rights of just such persons-a duty expressed not only in the Framers'
comments quoted here, but more recently by, among others, Justice Felix Frankfurter. See Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (stating that the Due Process Clause operates to protect "the lowliest
and most outcast").
121. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 587 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring).
122. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann & M.N.S. Sellers, The United States and the International
CriminalCourt, 50 Am.J. CoMP. L. 381, 381-91 (Supp. 2002) (detailing the nature and manifestations
of ICC opposition); Anupam Chander, Globalization and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1193, 1197 (2005)
(discussing U.S. opposition to a "dazzlingly broad" range of international ventures, among them the
ICC, the Kyoto Protocol on Global Warming, agencies of the United Nations, the Convention on the
Law of the Sea, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty).
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consensus among those who have addressed the issue." 123 In Lawrence, the
Court discussed European jurisprudence and other countries' laws in the course
of enunciating its view of the values-as Lawrence, borrowing from Bowers,
put it, the "civilization"-on which the Constitution is founded.1 24 The Court
took pains in Simmons to explain that global views confirmed but did not
control its own conclusion that capital punishment
of juvenile offenders is
25
1
States.
United
the
of
Constitution
the
by
forbidden
In each case, moreover, the Court limited its citations to authorities arising
out of legal systems or cultures that shared with the United States a commitment
to fundamental rights. A common point of reference was Britain, wellspring of
the "Anglo-American legal heritage" long recognized as an authoritative source
for interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. 126 Another was France, which shares
with the United States the Enlightenment tradition and a codification of rights
dating to the eighteenth century.1 2 7 Also discussed were multilateral treaties.
The United States is a state party to some of these; for instance, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as the Geneva Conventions on the laws of war. 128 All the treaties cited are products of the post-World
War II period during which concepts that matured in the United Statesfundamental fairness and equal protection, among others-spread across 1the
29
globe and were incorporated into national and international instruments.
Patently, the authorities cited were not the wholly alien influences that terms
130
like "foreign" or "external" might imply.
VI.

CABINING CONSULTATION

Consultation of foreign sources may aid an American judge in the exercise of
her constitutional duty to protect individual rights; most notably for present
purposes, the rights of a person caught within the net of the American criminal
justice system. But consultation cannot play this role well unless it occurs
within a predictable and consistent interpretive framework. Unfortunately, no
such framework has yet emerged. It is not yet clear when Justices will look to
external sources or for what reasons. Often, the catalyst for consultation appears

123. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2005).
124. See Lawrence v.Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003).
125. See Simmons, 543 U.S. at 574-75 (majority opinion).
126. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); see also supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
127. See Amann, Guantdnamo,supra note 90, at 301-03 & n.174.
128. See supra notes 23, 50 and accompanying text (describing sources cited by Justices). The
United States has signed but not ratified other treaties that Justices have cited. See, e.g., American
Convention, supra note 23.
129. See Amann, Guantdnamo,supra note 90, at 303 & n. 174.
130. See Amann, Norms, supra note 77, at 606 (explaining that "calling a cited norm 'external,'
though a convenient rhetorical feint, is a misnomer").
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to have been an amicus brief rather than a less litigant-driven factor. 131 In at
least one case, undue reliance on that source may have focused some Justices'
attention on international law to such a degree that they wrongly conferred on a
petitioner less protection against state action than other Justices would have
accorded him under a purely domestic constitutional analysis. 132 Furthermore,
the seeming absence of criteria or methodology has permitted critics to try to
dismiss consultation as just another way that so-called activist judges make
policy rather than interpret the law. Justice Breyer recognized as much when, in
a public debate with Justice Scalia, he said, "The criticism is you'll look over
the party, the cocktail party... to identify your friends."' 133 Breyer insisted that
he considered foreign precedents with which he disagreed as well as those with
which he agreed. 34 Such assurances ought not to stand alone, however; articulation of a transparent framework that constrains judicial consultation would do
far more to sap the choosing-friends criticism of its force.
This Article does not pretend to posit a comprehensive framework. But it
does point to a path along which that framework may be developed. Especially
useful is a 1999 formulation by Breyer, who advocated looking at external
practice to resolve "roughly comparable questions under roughly comparable

131. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576-78 (2005) (citing with respect to international law
not only respondent's brief, but also amicus briefs from the European Union, former President Jimmy
Carter, former U.S. diplomats, and the Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales);
Amann, Norms, supra note 77, at 604 n.36 (listing amicus briefs mentioned by Justices in the course of
discussing external norms in, inter alia, Lawrence and Atkins).
132. See Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2085, 2126-30 (2005) (arguing that
the controlling plurality opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), misconstrued international
law and in so doing denied petitioner, an American citizen, rights that two dissenters argued were due to
him under the Constitution); cf. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 622 (Scalia, J., dissenting), discussed supra note
56 and accompanying text; Amann, Norms, supra note 77, at 609 (making the same point with
particular reference to the use of the law of nations in the service of slavery).
133. Transcript of Discussion Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen
Breyer, American University Washington College of Law, Jan. 13, 2005, http:// domino.american.edu/
AU/media/mediarel.nsf/0/1F2F7DC4757FD01E85256F890068E6E0?OpenDocument (last visited Mar.
27, 2006) [hereinafter Scalia-Breyer Transcript]. The statement appears in slightly different form in the
edited version. Scalia-Breyer Conversation, supra note 70, at 53. The metaphor is one that the late
Judge Harold Leventhal, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, is said to have put forward as a
critique of using legislative history to interpret statutes. Id.; see supra note 53 and accompanying text
(quoting Scalia's usage in Simmons and attribution to Leventhal); Wald, Use, supra note 71, at 440-41
(advising "caution and restraint in the use of foreign decisions, but not an absolute bar," and remarking,
"I don't think that using foreign decisions should be, as my former colleague Harold Leventhal said
about legislative history, 'looking over a crowd and picking out your friends' (citing Patricia M. Wald,
Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195,
214 (1983) (quoting her own conversation with Leventhal))).
134. Specifically, Breyer said:
I would refer to the cases against me that I come across as much as for me. And the fact that
somebody's come out the other way in a foreign court doesn't make it any the less interesting.
Maybe it's more interesting. But this is not a major thing. It's not some kind of determinative
thing in dozens of cases of constitutional law; it's simply from time to time relevant. And if it
becomes more than that, I don't know how it's going to work.
Scalia-Breyer Transcript, supra note 133; see also Scalia-Breyer Conversation, supra note 70, at 53.
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legal standards., 135 From this phrase may be derived two minimum requirements: first, foreign jurisprudence ought to shed the light of experience on
questions like those presented in the case before the Court, and, second, it must
arise out of a legal culture that shares with the United States a commitment to
fundamental rights. Likewise essential is a third requirement, that in each case
the Court explain its reasons for looking to foreign sources and the way in
which those sources influenced its interpretation of the U.S. Constitution.
The "comparable questions" criterion imposes a baseline requirement that a
case have some cross-border component. Such components are present frequently in today's interdependent world. This is beyond dispute among practitioners though it appears still contestable in the academe. 136 As one example, a
litigant might hail from a country or culture outside the United States-this
often will be the case in a state like California, where more than a quarter of the
population is foreign-born. 137 Some of the conduct in dispute might take place
abroad; for instance, money laundering or drug trafficking is unlikely to merit
the time of federal prosecutors unless some portion of the transaction occurred
outside U.S. territory. A case might have no obvious overseas link and yet entail
facts such as those that a foreign tribunal has resolved. A case also might take
on an international aspect if it raises an issue, such as the death penalty, that is
of considerable international interest. 138 In such instances, U.S. courts might
benefit from knowledge of others' experience. Suggestion that the United States
has nothing to learn now that it has an indigenous jurisprudence thus astounds. 139 By the very act of looking to others' experience, moreover, U.S.

135. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of cert.); see
Breyer, supra note 70, at 265-66 (setting forth similar factors as a demonstration "of the need and
usefulness of international and foreign law"). Dean Starr has assigned much of the responsibility for
Rehnquist-era reversals to Justice Breyer, whose ascendance to the Court in 1994 is said to have
coincided with a resurgence of pragmatism. See Starr, supra note 92, at 1567. The assertion disregards
the role that consultation played in the reversals under review in this Article. A number of Justices
embraced consultation in Thompson, decided years before Breyer's arrival, and they retained their
willingness to look to external sources throughout the Stanford-inspired hiatus that soon ensued. See
supra text accompanying notes 19-49.
136. At least it is contested by Dean Starr. See Starr, supra note 92, at 1580-88. My own
understanding of transnational issues emerged while practicing federal criminal law in Pacific Rim
jurisdictions in the early 1990s; it has been reinforced by greater general awareness of such matters in
recent years.
137. See U.S. CENsus BUREAU, THE FOREIGN BORN POPULATION: 2000, at 3 (Dec. 2003), availableat
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-34.pdf (reporting that 26.2 percent of California residents
in 2000 were born outside United States).
138. See Amann, Norms, supra note 77, at 605-06 (citing examples of these types of cases).
139. See Starr, supra note 92, at 1582 (deflecting evidence of the Framers' receptivity to external
jurisprudence on the ground that "[alfter all, in 1787 there was relatively little American law for
American jurists to apply"); but see Amann, Norms, supra note 77, at 601 ("Consideration of external
norms ebbed as internal jurisprudence grew, yet it did not disappear entirely."). The passage cited by
Dean Starr as evidence of the limited relevance of judicial practice at the founding of the Republic does
not support his premise. See Starr, supra note 92 at 1582-83 (quoting Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v.
Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815)). In Boyle, Chief Justice Marshall spoke of more than
"looking back to our common roots," as Starr contends. Id. Rather, Marshall declined either to accept
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courts would manifest an understanding of the United States as both a leader
and a partner in a global effort to instill liberal democratic values.
The "comparable legal standards" criterion assures the existence of such
shared values. Proper consultation thus requires judges to inquire into the nature
of the legal system or culture out of which a norm or practice arises. The
foreign system in question should be founded on rights like those enumerated in
the U.S. Constitution and the jurisprudence interpreting that document. If this is
the case, consideration of the work of that system may be seen as consistent
with an understanding of America as a nation that draws strength from contributions that may come from outside yet fortify internal values. The foreign system
also must endeavor in practice to enforce the rights that it espouses. For no
matter how well reasoned, a judgment arising out of a repressive regime rarely
would merit citation as persuasive authority by a U.S. court. Particularly for
those skeptical of consultation, reference to such a judgment fuels the fear that
foreign influence might diminish American respect for individual rights.' 40 But
even precedents derived from other fundamental rights jurisdictions may counsel against a right that is nonetheless appropriate to the American tradition.
Consulting judges are free-indeed, are duty-bound-to reject international
precedents that fail to confirm the values underlying the national constitutional
culture. 141

The third criterion, that of a reasoned explanation, will help to ensure that
neither of the first two criteria is determined cavalierly. Though perhaps discussed more often in relation to administrative agency decisions, 142 "reasoned
explanation" also refers to judicial decision-making. Professor Vikram David
Amar explained the rationale as follows:
[C]ourts can never completely insulate themselves from accusations of politicization. But courts' best defense here is to engage in a full and fair discussion
of the competing arguments and provide a clearly stated explanation of the
reasons behind their judgments. Well-reasoned explanations, in the form of
"any obvious misconstruction of public law made by the British courts" or to privilege those courts'
rules over "the recent rules of other countries." Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 198. The passage does not
bar consideration of such recent rules in order to identify the Constitution's contemporary meaning.
Marshall's readiness to reject inapt foreign law, moreover, is fully in keeping with a tenet of
consultation. See infra text accompanying note 141 (explaining judges' duty not to follow jurisprudence
contrary to American legal values).
140. See Amann, Norms, supra note 77 at 606 n.45 (referring to a speech in which Breyer
acknowledged this concern by admitting that his reference in Knight, 528 U.S. at 996 (dissenting from
denial of cert.), to an opinion of Zimbabwe's highest court might have been ill-advised).
141. See id. at 608 & nn.53-54 (citing instances in which non-U.S. courts considered, and then
rejected, holdings enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court). A number of Justices have stressed this. See,
e.g., Breyer, supra note 70, at 266 ("[C]omparative use of foreign constitutional decisions will not lead
us blindly to follow the foreign court."); Stevens Remarks, supra note 68, at 8; cf Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (Kennedy, J.), quoted supra text accompanying note 51.
142. See Craig N. Oren, Be Careful What You Wish For: Amending the Administrative Procedure

Act, 56 ADmiN. L. REv. 1141, 1143 (2004) (tracing the evolution of the reasoned explanation requirement in administrative law).
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judicial opinions, are a key institutional feature that distinguishes the exercise
of judicial power from other kinds of government power, and one that will
reduce, though not entirely eliminate, suspicions among the polity. In short,
judges have a duty to explain to the parties and the world not only what
decisions they reach, but also why those decisions have been reached. 143

Pursuant to this requirement, Justices who have looked to foreign or international norms ought to explicate why they chose to do so, what they learned from
the consultation, and how this learning affected their reasoning in the case at
bar. They would do well to explain both why they embraced certain foreign
precedents and why they rejected others. Committing such thought processes to
paper would enable not only parties, but also other Justices, other courts, other
lawyers, and the public at large to comprehend what mattered in the making of a
decision. Professor Pierre Legrand properly has stressed that explication would
pay to those who established a foreign norm or precedent the respect that is
their due. 144 Conversely, explication would pay respect to concerns of undue
foreign influence, for it would demonstrate that in a particular instance consultation was, as its proponents contend that it is, confirmatory and not conformatory.1 45 Explication presumes that the Court will train on foreign citations the
same gimlet eye that it casts on domestic citations; a litigant's description of a
judicial holding or a state practice ought to be double-checked no less if the
court or state is foreign than if it is domestic. This is, of course, hard work. One
need only look to the exhaustive nature of comparative analyses by international
tribunals-indeed, of the Court's own analyses of the historical roots of enumerated rights or of legal practice among the fifty-one jurisdictions in the United

143. Vikram David Amar, Adventures in Direct Democracy: The Top Ten Constitutional Lessons
from the California Recall Experience, 92 CAL. L. REv. 927, 940 (2004); see also id. at 940 n.62 ("'A
requirement that judges give reasons for their decisions-grounds of decision that can be debated,
attacked, and defended-serves a vital function in constraining the judiciary's exercise of power."')
(quoting David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARv. L. REv. 731, 737 (1987)); Diane
Marie Amann, InternationalDecisions: Prosecutor v. Kuprelkic, 96 Am. J. INr'L L. 439, 444 (2002)
(discussing appellate reversal of an international criminal tribunal conviction on the ground that the
trial judges failed to meet a reasoned explanation standard); Patricia M. Wald, Reflections on Judging:
At Home and Abroad, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 219, 241 (2004) (contrasting civil law judicial practices
with the common law system, the latter characterized in part by "the fully reasoned explanation of
decisions that we are accustomed to").
144. Pierre Legrand, Professor of Law at the Universit6 de Paris 1 (Pantheon-Sorbonne) and Visiting
Professor of Law at the University of San Diego, Remarks at UCLA Law Faculty Workshop (Sept. 23,
2005) (emphasizing this point in his presentation of Comparative Legal Studies and the Matter of
Authenticity, 1 J. COMP. L. (forthcoming 2006)). In response to questions, Legrand added that in his
view, U.S. courts had a duty to analyze foreign sources more rigorously than they might domestic
sources, for the simple reason that the former are "foreign."
145. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55 (discussing the terms "confirmatory" and "conformatory"). It is precisely because of these concerns about the legitimacy of consultation that the Justices
ought not simply consider "the thoughtful views of ... judges sitting in other countries," Stevens
Remarks, supra note 68, at 8, but also to explain what rendered these judges' pronouncements
thoughtful enough to merit consideration.
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States-to grasp the challenge of robust reasoning.' 4 6 It is thus not surprising
that even Justices supportive of consultation at times have expressed doubts
about the Court's capacity to consult. Justice Souter once posed the question of
"whether an independent front-line investigation into the facts of a foreign
country's legal administration can be soundly undertaken through American
courtroom litigation."' 4 7 Breyer maintained that "[n]either I nor my law clerks
can easily find relevant comparative material on our own," so that "lawyers
must do the basic work: finding, analyzing, and referring us to that material.' 4 8
But upon choosing to consult, a court ought to assume a responsibility to
educate itself and its staff on the intricacies of international and comparative
law. Creative means ought to be considered: It is worth recalling that in
Thompson, the case with which this account of consultation began, Justices
relied on a Library of Congress study of the juvenile death penalty, conducted
after oral argument, rather than base their reasoning solely on a human rights
group's amicus brief.14 9 Without full exploitation of the resources at its command, the Court will remain prone to legal oddities, such as its decision in
Simmons to place greater emphasis on a multilateral convention that the United
States has not ratified than it did on the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, a treaty regarded as part of an international bill of rights and to
50
which the United States is a state party. 1
The criteria of comparable question, comparable law, and reasoned explanation, in short, represent an outline for a framework that could do much to secure
for consultation of external norms a place in the American canon of constitutional interpretation.

146. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 824 & nn.17-22, 826-27 & nn.24-26, 839-48
(1988) (plurality opinion) (detailing in text, footnotes, and six appendices states' laws respecting
juvenile execution and other treatment of minors); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 55, 60-66 (1932)
(recounting treatment of the right to counsel in old England, the American colonies, and states of the
Union); Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald
and Judge Vohrah, 32-89 (Oct. 7, 1997) (engaging in an extended comparison of countries' treatment
of the duress defense). The risk that consultation may be misused is obvious, as both this Article and
Starr, supra note 92, at 1585-86, recognize. But the risk does not compel a categorical ban on looking
to foreign law, any more than a similar risk requires a categorical ban on looking to legislative history.
The risk does, however, underscore the need for consultation to follow a rigorous and transparent
methodology.
147. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 787 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
148. Breyer, supra note 70, at 267.
149. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 815 (1988) (indicating that the case was argued in November 1987);
supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the use of a January 1988 Library of Congress report
in Thompson).
150. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576-77 (2005) (discussing at length the Children's Convention, supra note 50, yet only including reference to ICCPR, supra note 23, in a string cite); see also id.
at 622 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (chiding the Court for discussing a treaty "which every country in the
world has ratified save for the United States and Somalia") (emphasis in original); cf. Amann,
Convergence?, supra note 85, at 825-27 (discussing the status of ICCPR as a foundational international
human rights instrument). Notwithstanding a pertinent U.S. reservation to the ICCPR, this prioritization
likely struck many international lawyers as odd.
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CONCLUSION

It is commonplace to name a decade after a societal trend-the Seventies as
the "Me Decade," for instance--even though the trend developed before or
lasted after those years. The same may be said of the practice of naming a Court
after its Chief Justice or a political movement after its most prominent purveyor.
To speak as this Article does of the "Rehnquist Court" is to profess to synthesize diverse juridical developments that occurred in fits and starts over nearly a
score of years. The task is impossible, and the phrasing cannot be taken literally.
No one person can be responsible for the evolution in that period of an
institution led by a shifting complement of nine individuals. Seeds of a doctrine
that wins support in the time of one Chief likely were sown in the time of his
predecessor and may not bear fruit until the time of his successor. Surely this
was true of the "Rehnquist Court." The elevation of its namesake served an
already strong preference among conservatives for what they termed "judicial
restraint"-that is, for a judge to refrain as a matter of course from interference
with the actions of the executive or enactments of the legislature. The concept
tends to be associated with a movement known as the "Reagan Revolution,"
even though criticism of the Warren Court's expansive rights jurisprudence was
prevalent during the checkered tenure of a prior President, Richard M. Nixon,
and even though the full effects of the movement were unclear even a decade
and a half after Reagan left office.
As early as 1970 Chief Justice Burger had written to fellow Nixon appointee
Harry A. Blackmun of his plan to move the Court "'away from the attitude that
everything unwise or wicked is unconstitutional and that if we but search, we
will find some long hidden meaning in Due Process or Equal Protection or
whatnot.' 15 1 The steadfast steward of that plan proved not to be Burger but
rather the third Nixon appointee to the office of Associate Justice, William H.
Rehnquist. His solo opinions earned him the nickname "Lone Ranger"; even as
Chief, Rehnquist often found himself dissenting in service of a conservative
agenda. 152 On some matters a majority came around to his view, a fact due in
part to Rehnquist's influence, but also to changes in the Court's composition
and in the legal and political landscape that surrounded the Court.
This is the case with respect to Justices' use of foreign and international
sources in constitutional decisionmaking. In 1989, the still-new Chief declared
to a multinational gathering of jurists that "it is time that the United States

151. LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN 52 (2005) (quoting Chief Justice Burger).
152. See Bernard Schwartz, Term Limits, Commerce, and the Rehnquist Court, 31 TULSA L.J. 521,
529 (1996) (stating that as Associate Justice, Rehnquist "dissented alone fifty-four times-a Court
record" for which his law clerks gave him a Lone Ranger doll, and that as Chief he could forge a
"fragile" majority only if both Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, "'swing' Justices," joined him and the
more predictable Justices Scalia and Thomas); Saundra Saperstein & George Lardner Jr., Rehnquist:
Nixon's Long Shot for a 'Law and Order' Court; On the Bench, a Confirmed Lone Ranger, WASH. POST,
July 7, 1986, at Al; see also supra text accompanying note 25 (discussing opposition to the use of
international law).
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courts begin looking to the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in their
own deliberative process."1 53 Yet the same year, in Stanford, he joined an
opinion that treated reference to world opinion as un-American. ls4 The Stanford
rebuff held sway for more than a decade. It won adherents in the political
branches and the academy. But support within the Court dwindled, and so
Rehnquist found himself in the minority in Atkins, Lawrence, and Simmons,
three decisions that reversed criminal justice precedents set during his tenure. 55
In each reversal the majority, despite still-heated objection from Rehnquist,
looked to external sources that militated in favor of recognizing or expanding
the scope of constitutional rights. A majority of other Justices thus displayed
increased willingness to take into account foreign and international norms and
practice. This judicial response left much to be desired as the October 2004
Term came to end; the need to flesh out the theoretical bases for and the
methodology of consultation was evident.
One could not predict whether that need would be fulfilled. Long-term
prospects for the practice itself were in doubt in the wake of Rehnquist's
passing and the retirement of O'Connor. The latter often was receptive to
consultation; in stark contrast, her successor, Samuel A. Alito, Jr., proclaimed,
156
"I don't think that foreign law is helpful in interpreting the Constitution."
Rehnquist, meanwhile, was replaced by one of his former law clerks, John G.
Roberts, Jr. 15 7 Like Rehnquist, after his clerkship Roberts labored in the Executive Branch; moreover, written works indicated that Roberts shared much of the
"judicial restraint" philosophy of his initial employers, Rehnquist and Reagan.1 58 Roberts's writings further evinced a resistance to domestic application
of foreign and international law similar to that of those two mentors. In a 1984
memorandum, Roberts characterized as "not unfounded" concerns expressed by
opponents to U.S. ratification of the U.N. treaty against genocide-concerns
similar to those raised today by opponents of the International Criminal Court-

153. William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts-Comparative Remarks (1989), reprinted in 14
GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTuRE-A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 411, 412

(Paul Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993).
154. See supra note 38-39 and accompanying text.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 33-57 (discussing these judgments).
156. U.S. Senator Arlen Specter (R-Pa) Holds a Hearing on the Nomination of Judge Samuel Alito
to the Supreme Court, Part Two, Jan. 10, 2006, FDCH CAPITAL TRANSCRIPTS, 2006 WLNR 52434; see
also Jo Becker & Amy Goldstein, '86Alito Memo Argues Against Foreigners'Rights,WASH. POST, Nov.

29, 2005, at A4 (reporting on a memorandum in which Alito, then a Justice Department lawyer, "argued
that immigrants who enter the United States illegally and foreigners living outside their countries are
not entitled to the constitutional rights afforded to Americans").
157. See Maura Reynolds, Roberts Is Sworn In as ChiefJustice, L.A. TimEs, Sept. 30, 2005, at Al.
158. On Roberts's background, see Charles Lane, Roberts Was Influenced by Critics of the Warren
Court; Like Rehnquist, the Nominee Is a Skeptic on Judicial Intervention, WASH. POST, Sept. 6,2005, at
A], and R. Jeffrey Smith, Amy Goldstein & Jo Becker, A CharterMember of Reagan Vanguard,WASH.
POST, Aug. 1, 2005, at At. On Rehnquist's service as law clerk to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert H.
Jackson and, later, in the U.S. Department of Justice, see Savage, supra note 6.
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but recommended joinder for geopolitical reasons. 159 In a decision rendered just
days before Bush tapped him for the High Court, Roberts joined colleagues on
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in approving the
use of special military commissions to try persons whom the President designates enemy combatants. 160 And he provided the decisive vote in that case for
the holding that the Third Geneva Convention, even if it were justiciable in U.S.
courts, does not apply to anyone who takes up arms on behalf of a nonstate
entity like al Qaeda.16 1 Most tellingly, in his confirmation hearings, Roberts
spoke of consultation in words virtually identical to Scalia's dissent in Simmons: "As somebody said in another context, looking at foreign law for support
is like looking out over a crowd and picking out your friends." 162 Roberts then
positioned himself closer to Scalia than to Breyer, the other Justice who had
brought this metaphor into the consultation debate. Roberts deflected a suggestion that consultation constituted an impeachable offense; nonetheless, voicing a
now-standard critique, Roberts judged consultation "a misuse of precedent" on
the ground that it accords courts too much interpretive discretion. 63 It thus
seems clear that on issues like consultation of foreign sources, the last chapters
of the Rehnquist Court narrative, no less than those of the Reagan Revolution,
have not yet been written.

159. See Amy Argetsinger & Jo Becker, Roberts Set Out Doubts on Genocide Treaty, WASH. POST,
Sept. 3, 2005, at A3 (quoting Roberts as advising ratification of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, reasoning that although
"Iobjections are not unfounded, ... a consensus has evolved that they are outweighed by the propaganda windfall our failure to ratify the convention has already afforded our international opponents"');
cf Harold Hongju Koh, et. al., The Treaty Power, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 101, 110 n.47 (1988) (remarks
of Professor Koh) (stating that the United States became a state party to the treaty after "the Reagan
administration offered the Genocide Convention for advice and consent with more conditions than had
been offered by any prior Administration").
160. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (rejecting a challenge brought by a
Guant~namo detainee alleged to have been Osama bin Laden's personal driver), cert. granted, 126 S.
Ct. 622 (Nov. 7, 2005) (No. 05-184). For discussion of special commissions, see Amann, Guantdnamo,
supra note 90, at 268-70, 329-35.
161. One member of the panel disagreed with the view, set forth in Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 40-42, that
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention (No. 1I1) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, does not apply. Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 44 (Williams, J., concurring)
(arguing that Common Article 3 fills a gap in order to assure "some minimal protection" for nonstate
actors).
162. Transcript: Day Two of the Roberts Confirmation Hearings; (Part Ill: Sens. Kyl and Kohl),
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Sept. 13, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 14576513 [hereinafter Roberts-Kyl
Transcript] (responding to a question from Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ)); see also supra note 53 and
accompanying text.
163. Roberts-Kyl Transcript, supra note 162 (elaborating further on how consultation "expands the
discretion of the judge"); see Roberts-Coburn Transcript, supra note 63 (responding to a query that
implicitly linked consultation with impeachment by stating that although in Roberts's view consultation
is not "a good approach," Roberts planned "to sit down and argue" with his colleagues and "wouldn't
accuse judges or justices who disagree ... of violating their oath"); see also supra text accompanying
note 133 (discussing Breyer's use of metaphor).
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